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Abstract
Background: The Demand-Driven Evaluations for Decisions (3DE) programme was piloted in Zambia and Uganda
in 2012–2015. It aimed to answer evaluative questions raised by policymakers in Ministries of Health, rapidly and
with limited resources. The aim of our evaluation was to assess whether the 3DE model was successful in supporting
and increasing evidence-based policymaking, building capacity and changing behaviour of Ministry staff.
Methods: Using mixed methods, we compared the ex-ante theory of change with what had happened in practice,
why and with what results (intended and unintended), including a qualitative assessment of 3DE’s contribution. Data
sources included a structured quality assessment of the five impact evaluations produced, 46 key informant interviews
at national and international levels, structured extraction from 170 programme documents, a wider literature review of
relevant topics, and a political economy analysis conducted in Zambia.
Results: We found that 3DE had a very limited contribution to changing evidence-based policymaking, capacity and
behaviour in both countries as a result of having a number of aspirations not all compatible with one another.
Co-developing evaluation questions was more time-consuming than anticipated, Ministry evidence needs did not
fit neatly into questions suitable for impact evaluations and constricted timeframes for undertaking trials did not
necessarily produce the most effective results and value for money. The evaluation recommended a focusing of
objectives and a more strategic approach to strengthening evaluative demand and capacity.
Conclusions: Lessons emerge that are likely to apply in other low- and middle-income settings, such as the
importance of supporting evaluative thinking and capacity within wider institutions, of understanding the political
economy of evidence use and its uptake, and of allowing for some flexibility in terms of programme targets. Fixating
on one type of evidence is unhelpful in the context of institutions like ministries of health, which require a wide range
of evidence to plan and deliver programmes. In addition, having success tied to indicators, such as number of ‘policy
decisions made’, provides potentially perverse incentives and neglects arguably more important aspects such as
incremental programmatic adjustments and improved implementation.
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Background
Evidence can shape policy decisions in a variety of
ways. Our primary interest is often in understanding
whether and under what circumstances robust evi-
dence directly contributes to a policy decision. Yet, as
Johnson describes [1], the application of evidence to
inform concrete policy decisions (such as scaling up,
discontinuing or redesigning a particular programme)
is only one aspect of its possible influence. In
addition to this ‘instrumental’ role, how evidence is
used in decision-making may also be classified as
legitimising (using evidence to justify a prior deci-
sion), conceptualising (providing new ideas), symbolis-
ing (emphasising strategic points such as value for
money) or mis-using (suppressed or used to serve a
political objective) [2]. These different ways of using
evidence may occur at different points in the policy
cycle [1, 3], depend on the particular types of evidence
available, and be influenced by wider organisational
and contextual considerations [4].
The literature suggests that the extent of uptake of
evaluation evidence (meaning evidence generated by
all types of evaluations, but excluding routine moni-
toring) in policy is often relatively modest. A compre-
hensive report on relevance, quality and influence of
impact evaluations conducted by the World Bank
Group found that, while impact evaluation evidence
was observed in some cases to make a positive
contribution to development practice and policy
debate, systematic use of evidence was weakened by a
number of constraints, such as lack of government
demand or champions [5]. This conclusion was
echoed by a European Commission study on the
effects of knowledge generated by EuropeAid’s stra-
tegic evaluations, which found that, although there
were some notable cases of the information being
used to inform distinctive policy choices or raise
conceptual understanding, findings do not tend to be
incorporated into decision-making at an institutional
level without a concerted effort to ‘broker’ the evi-
dence into the decision-making process [2].
Both reviews note that detecting or measuring the
extent of evidence uptake is challenging, especially
given that some of the broader level influences on how
knowledge is used in the policy process may be intan-
gible such as relationships between researchers, depart-
ments and wider stakeholders [4, 6, 7]. However, much
can still be said about the factors that may affect the
likelihood that relevant evidence is used in policy-
making in a rational way. Focusing on the use of evalu-
ation evidence in particular, and drawing on Johnson et
al. [1], we categorise these factors as characteristics of
the evaluation, characteristics of the evaluation user
and wider contextual factors.
Evaluation (supply) characteristics
In order to be relevant, information presented to policy-
makers should be salient (relevant to the problem),
credible (high technical quality) and legitimate (pro-
duced without bias or political interference and through
a transparent process) [8, 9]. One of the primary findings
to emerge in the literature is that evidence produced by
evaluations is not always perceived as relevant to the
practical requirements of policymaking [2, 10–12]. Eval-
uations should address identified policy needs, deliver
clear recommendations and pay close attention to polit-
ical and contextual factors such as organisational culture
[13]. Yet, evaluation evidence can appear to cater more
to a research audience than the practical needs of policy-
makers. Impact evaluations in particular may be more
focused on what happened in interventions rather than
why the results arose, deliver recommendations that
have many caveats (and are therefore not straightfor-
ward to interpret or apply), or present results in a highly
technical way [2, 11]. Consideration of the political
climate or the likely resource requirements of imple-
menting recommendations may also be overlooked, ac-
cording to the review of five case studies undertaken on
behalf of the Centres for Learning on Evaluation and Re-
sults initiative (CLEAR) in 2014. The outcome is that
policymakers often struggle to draw lessons from exist-
ing evaluation work or to locate evidence that meets
their information needs.
Some policy questions that governments are con-
cerned with are also not well suited to ostensibly rigor-
ous evaluation techniques such as randomised
controlled trials (RCTs) [11, 14], either because the
methodology only answers a small part of the overall
question or because data quality is poor. This means
that what researchers define as rigorous evidence is not
what is required to make policy decisions, raising issues
of what constitutes ‘credible’ evidence.
Secondly, evaluation evidence is often not available
when policy decisions need to be made [2, 10, 11]. The
rapid decision-making that may be required by political
calendars is incompatible with in-depth evaluation pro-
cesses where recommendations may take several months
or years to produce [14]. This means that, in common
with other forms of evidence, windows of opportunity to
influence policy may often be missed, and by the time
results are available, evaluations may have lost much of
their relevance to current policy issues.
A third factor identified in the literature is that empir-
ical evidence is not well communicated to policymakers
since reports may be excessively technical [12, 15] or
they may be poorly written and ineffectively dissemi-
nated to their intended audiences [2].
The failure of some evaluators to deliver high quality,
timely, policy-relevant and appropriately communicated
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findings to policymakers points to a wider concern that
the priorities of the producers and users of evaluation
are not closely aligned. This is in part due to the fact
that evaluations in lower- and middle-income countries
tend to be commissioned by international development
partners [16]. There is some evidence that this is chan-
ging in line with the recommendations of the Paris
Declarations, which call for greater in-country owner-
ship of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) efforts. Yet,
although there are some notable and important exam-
ples of evaluations being managed internally by govern-
ment ministries with designated M&E oversight [13, 17],
the study on supply and demand for evaluation evidence
undertaken on behalf of CLEAR finds that in-country
M&E work remains mostly limited to performance mon-
itoring rather than evaluation [16]. As a result, evalu-
ation evidence may often be generated by independent
researchers who do not have policy concerns at the fore-
front of their agenda, and instead prioritise research ob-
jectives such as obtaining publication in peer-reviewed
journals [10].
User (demand) characteristics
A prerequisite for the actual use of evaluations in policy
is that key political actors demand evidence to be made
available and are receptive to the findings. Guidance
produced by the World Bank Group on strengthening
government capacity in generating and using M&E
evidence argues that weak demand for evaluation evi-
dence can pose an even greater limitation to the use of
evaluation evidence in policy than the issues around
evaluation characteristics described above [17, 18].
There are mixed findings in the literature on whether
this demand exists in different contexts. Hyder et al. [19]
find that policymakers actively value the evidence
produced by evaluations. CLEAR also note, in their
study of M&E systems in nine sub-Saharan African
countries, that there are promising and increasing indi-
cations of evaluation demand by governments and civil
society [16, 17]. However, low demand has been a
commonly encountered obstacle across the body of the
World Bank Impact Evaluation Group’s work [18].
Weak demand for evidence is partly to do with issues
related to evaluation characteristics, but there are also im-
portant causes unrelated to the supply of impact evalua-
tions. In the first place, evaluation evidence may simply be
less useful to policymakers under some circumstances
than other kinds of knowledge. Second, the type of evalu-
ation matters; in South Africa, the National Evaluation
System conducts implementation, impact, diagnostic,
design and economic evaluations to help “maximise the
likelihood of alignment between the evaluation and
departmental willingness to use the findings” ([17], p. 5).
Additional evidence sources that policymakers may
demand include the accumulated experience of stake-
holders and institutions, wider research evidence, statis-
tical data, and the knowledge of citizens and stakeholders
about their own policy needs [12, 20]. A balance of differ-
ent sources and types of evidence is required to develop
good policy, and it is not the case that evaluation evidence
is self-evidently superior.
The values and beliefs of individual decision-makers
can also be strong drivers of uptake [3, 20]. Their
assumptions about what constitutes robust evidence can
be difficult to overturn, particularly where new informa-
tion contradicts a strongly held ideology [5]. The pro-
pensity of policymakers to rationally apply evidence to
policy issues also depends crucially on political calcula-
tions and contextual factors. Evidence may be disre-
garded or even concealed if it is not consistent with a
particular political calculation or threatens the interests
of powerful groups [20].
Another potential cause of limited demand for evalu-
ation evidence is that policymakers themselves are not
sufficiently skilled in evaluation methods, in part due to
limited exposure [5]. The CLEAR midterm evaluation
report [16] observed that demand for evaluations by pol-
icymakers is often ‘latent’ – they do want information to
support their decisions but do not recognise that evalua-
tions can be a source of this evidence. In a systematic re-
view of the barriers to evidence use in policymaking,
Oliver et al. [10] report that policymakers themselves
expressed a need for support in building their own know-
ledge to help them make use of evaluation evidence.
Contextual factors relevant to evidence uptake
Beyond the immediate characteristics of evaluations and
evaluators, the literature also emphasises the role of
political, institutional and organisational factors in shap-
ing the way that evidence is used in policymaking. A
central argument is that, if evaluations explicitly engage
with the political economy, the evidence is more likely
to be used [16]. However, there are some acknowledged
challenges associated with assessing political economy
factors. Political systems are complex and difficult to
characterise, and Liverani et al. [21] note that there are
several gaps in the current understanding of the implica-
tions of different political systems for evidence uptake.
However, there have been some recent advances in
developing knowledge in this area [1, 16].
Among the findings is that the distribution of decision-
making power across the political system has a crucial ef-
fect on the opportunities for evidence uptake. In more
mature democracies, decentralised systems, in which
many actors have a stake in guiding policy, may be associ-
ated with greater use of evidence to support processes of
policy contestation, i.e. the ability to marshal evidence be-
comes important as a way to secure support for particular
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policy positions or undermine competing views [20, 21].
In a related point, some studies argue that higher levels of
government accountability observed in mature democra-
cies can lead to increased evidence use since policymakers
face pressure to demonstrate and justify the basis on
which decisions are taken [17, 22].
Although the existence of political accountability and
platforms for policy debate may create potential for
evidence uptake, they do not guarantee it. Instead of
applying evidence to policy problems in an impartial
way, political actors may behave opportunistically by
purposefully selecting evidence to back up pre-existing
policy positions or present findings in a misleading way
[20, 21]. Where accountability to electorates and civil
society is strong, the motivation to rely on the evidence
basis for policy choices may be outweighed by the
pressure to meet public perceptions or fulfil election
promises [11]. There is no system of government that
ensures ‘rational’ evidence-based policy [23] because the
nature of politicisation varies between contexts, systems
and issues.
Several papers also identify features of individual
government ministries that are relevant to evidence use.
Liverani et al. [21] report that highly fragmented respon-
sibility within individual bureaucracies can reduce the
ability of ministers and their staff to engage with
evidence that falls outside their immediate area of work
[21]. A high rate of staff turnover is also found to lower
the potential for critical engagement with new evidence
by shortening the ‘institutional memory’ of the depart-
ment, failing to use existing evidence and causing
current practices to appear novel. Organisational struc-
tures and processes are also important; Shaxson et al. [4]
observe how departmental planning, budgeting and
reporting processes may focus the evidence base on the
short term rather than more strategic issues and conse-
quently influence the relationships between the various
groups of people who provide, broker and use evidence.
The pilot programme
The Demand-Driven Impact Evaluations for Decisions
(3DE) pilot was designed by the Clinton Health Access
Initiative (CHAI) and IDinsight. It was based on the
recognition that Ministry of Health (MoH) officials often
lack evidence on the most effective and efficient ways in
which to deliver known clinical interventions and
services. Further, where evidence is generated, it is often
not relevant to the operational needs of MoH officials or
done within a period that meets decision-making time-
frames. The 3DE pilot model aimed to facilitate a more
demand-driven approach to the evaluation of health
interventions by (1) identifying relevant, suitable and
priority evaluation questions from the ministries, (2)
conducting these evaluations rigorously but rapidly and
in an affordable manner, and (3) catalysing the response
to their findings and sharing the lessons learned from
this process more widely, so as to influence future evalu-
ation processes. Under this pilot, 3DE was expected to
conduct eight (later revised to five) impact evaluations
that influenced managerial decisions in six instances
(later revised to four) in Uganda and Zambia. The inter-
ventions that were evaluated under the 3DE pilot are
summarised in Table 1. The evaluations were expected
to be completed and presented to policymakers within
9 months of their commencement. The pilot had a
budget of £2 million and was funded by the UK Depart-
ment for International Development.
This article presents findings from the evaluation of
the 3DE pilot. Its main objective is to provide lessons on
how to design evidence support programmes or initia-
tives for the health sector (and potentially other sectors
too). It builds on the small but growing literature docu-
menting attempts to support evidence-based policy at
institutional level in low- and middle-income countries.
Methods
The overall aim of the evaluation, conducted in 2015,
was to assess whether the 3DE model had been success-
ful in supporting and increasing evidence-based policy-
making, building capacity and changing the behaviour of
Ministry staff in terms of demanding and using evidence
(as these were the 3DE objectives).
Analytical approach
As the evaluation was commissioned ex-post and there
was no credible counterfactual, the evaluation took a
theory-based approach, starting from the theory of
change for 3DE, structured by process, outputs and out-
comes (Fig. 1). Assumptions and causal pathways were
elaborated, based on the literature and initial discus-
sions. These included behavioural outcomes, which were
expected, hoped for or ideal, particularly relating to the
outcomes of the programme (see extended theory of
change). Mixed methods were then used to undertake
contribution analysis and to establish, for each of the
main domains, (1) what happened in practice (what ac-
tivities were undertaken by 3DE and what the responses
were of Ministry and other stakeholders); (2) why what
happened took place (particularly the role of the 3DE
intervention but also any other relevant factors); and (3)
with what results (intended and unintended). These
findings were then compared with what was planned in
the original 3DE programme documents and the theory
of change. The analysis answered evaluative questions
about 3DE but also refined the theory of change for
future programmes.
The evaluation considered 3DE as a whole, including
consideration of how it was established and the
Witter et al. Health Research Policy and Systems  (2017) 15:86 Page 4 of 12
prioritisation of evaluation questions that the 3DE evalu-
ations would seek to answer. However, each individual
evaluation conducted by 3DE constituted a case study
within the overall framework, which could be compared
in order to generate a richer understanding of differ-
ences and similarities.
As most of the work had been undertaken in Zambia,
this was the focus of the evaluation; nevertheless, a
modified set of questions was used in Uganda to learn
from the experience there. The evaluation was therefore
able to draw from evidence from two national settings
and across five different evaluations.
Data collection and analysis
Five main sources of evidence were used for the evaluation.
Quality assessment of five evaluations
Given the overall objective of the intervention, the pur-
pose of this component was to test the effectiveness of
the programme in generating high quality evaluations.
The quality of the 3DE evaluations was assessed against
a set of specific questions, including the relevance and
clarity of the evaluation questions; the extent to which
contextual factors that could affect the evaluation were
considered; the clarity and level of detail with which the
intervention was described; the extent the evaluation
considered other programmes that may have affected
key indicators; the appropriateness of the evaluation
methodology, including the adequacy of the sample size,
and the extent to which baseline differences, spillover ef-
fects, externalities, imperfect compliance, non-response
and attrition were dealt with appropriately; the appropri-
ateness and rigour of the data sources and data collec-
tion; the rigour of the analysis including appropriate
calculation of standard errors and use of sampling
weights; the clarity and plausibility of the links between
data, interpretation and conclusions; and the external
validly of the evaluation.
The assessment was applied to all five evaluations con-
ducted by 3DE, although only three were finalised at the
time of evaluation and so could be examined in relation
to all quality assurance questions. Details of the assess-
ment have been previously published [24].
Key informant interviews
Forty-six key informant interviews were conducted,
using semi-structured topic guides. The participants in-
cluded a range of stakeholders internationally and in the
two focal countries from government (n = 17), the 3DE
programme (n = 16), and development partners and
other institutions (n = 13). The interviewees were ini-
tially sampled purposefully to maximise information-rich
cases augmented by snow-balling during the evaluation.
The interviews were thematically coded and entered into
Table 1 Interventions evaluated under the 3DE pilot
Intervention name Country Description
Mama kits Zambia This intervention provided non-monetary ‘mama kits’ to pregnant mothers
conditional on delivering at a health facility. The objective of the intervention
was to increase facility delivery rates, and ultimately maternal and newborn
health outcomes in Zambia
Community-fixed point implementation of insecticide-treated
bed-nets (ITNs)
Zambia The intervention distributed ITNs to community members using a ‘fixed point’
approach, in which bed-nets were given out at a particular place in the
community rather than by volunteers visiting households door-to-door
to deliver and hang-up nets; the objective of the evaluation was to understand
how this approach compared to the door-to-door method in terms of rates of
retention and use of bed-nets, and cost-effectiveness
Health facility reinforcement and early infant diagnosis (EID)
and immunisation service integration on HIV testing and
immunisation services
Zambia The objectives of the programme were to improve the identification of
HIV-positive mothers and infants in Zambia, in order to ultimately improve
the timeliness of treatment and health outcomes It strengthened supplies
of HIV testing kits, reinforced guidelines around early-infant diagnosis and
HIV-testing for mothers to health service providers, and also included a
component that sought to integrate EID testing services with scheduled
6-week immunisation visits for infants
Decongestion of busy anti-retroviral therapy (ART) clinics Zambia The objective of the intervention was to improve ART service efficiency, and
ultimately the supply of ART; it involved providing resources to improve the
availability of stocks at health facilities, emphasising the application of existing
guidelines around ART refills, and providing a designated person to work in
targeted facilities to ensure that protocols are correctly observed
Family clinic days Uganda The intervention provided family-centred care and health education to
HIV-positive adolescents and children and their families, through a designated
clinic day; during these, clinics delivered specialised health education and
psychosocial support to patients and caregivers; the main objectives were
to improve the retention of HIV-positive paediatric and adolescent patients
in care
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an analysis spreadsheet, which was structured according
to the key nodes in the theory of change. By reading
down the columns, views from informants and evidence
from 3DE programme documents could be triangulated
on each topic, and a summary of evidence created.
Document analysis
Over 170 documents of various types (such as 3DE
programme documents, financial reports, MoH policies
and strategies, and development partner reports) were
read, thematically coded and entered into the same
spread sheet used for the key informants [25]. An im-
portant caveat was that much of this evidence was
generated by the project and may have therefore been
biased toward demonstrating progress and success.
Internal evidence was given weight in the summary de-
scription of what was done and why. External evidence was
given more weighting in the final evaluative judgements.
Literature review
A literature review was undertaken to understand the
background and wider global context for 3DE. This
focused on a number of topics, including evidence on
general experience and the efficacy of demand-led evalu-
ations; evidence on evaluation use and uptake by policy-
makers; evidence on formal and informal barriers and
enablers for conducting and using impact evaluations by
policymakers/government officials; other global initia-
tives and experiences of demand-led evaluations; and re-
views of on-going and recent impact evaluations in the
health sectors of Zambia and Uganda.
The body of literature reviewed included research pa-
pers, articles, theoretical discussion papers and synthesis
reports drawing together the findings of other work.
Political economy analysis
A political economy analysis of the health sector in
Zambia was conducted to better understand the context-
ual factors influencing the outcomes of the 3DE model,
with particular focus on resource allocation and decision-
making within the two Ministries being studied, and how
evidence was used in their policymaking processes.
Evaluation limitations
Some important limitations should be noted, including
the relatively short timeframe of 3DE, which did not
allow for the assessment of health outcome changes or
the necessary maturation of catalysation activities. As a
result, the evaluation focused on processes more than
outcomes. The Ugandan experience also received more
limited analysis compared to the Zambian one, given
that no evaluation had yet been completed in Uganda.
Fig. 1 Programme theory of change
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Results
The theory of change of 3DE (Fig. 1) stipulated that
findings from 3DE evaluations, that were based on ques-
tions raised by the MoH, were conducted in close col-
laboration with them, and that produced timely and
well-presented results, were more likely to be adopted
into policy than traditional evaluations which lacked
these characteristics. Improved evidence uptake was
expected to result in the implementation of better health
policies and programmes that would ultimately improve
health outcomes for the population. Supporting the
MoH in following through with evaluations and assisting
them in implementing its recommendations was seen, in
addition to the relevance and timeliness of the evalua-
tions, as an important feature of this pilot. All of these
steps were examined in the evaluation of 3DE, alongside
explanatory factors.
Question sourcing
Although the approach of starting from MoH questions
was laudable, one challenge faced was that ministries do
not generally have a prioritised set of research questions
and are often institutionally divided. In Zambia, a set of
ministerial research priorities had been established but it
was more of a theoretical wish list and many questions
were not amendable to answer by impact evaluation. In
Uganda, individual disease programmes had research
agendas but these had not been prioritised across the
ministry as a whole. Developing options and assessing
them was a much more intensive process than antici-
pated by the 3DE programme, and depended on strong
links to specific groups within the MoH, which also
biased the selection towards certain favoured programmes
(and away from areas with less strong programmes such
as mental health). In Uganda, a number of ‘false starts’
were made with different units within the MoH, which is
one reason why ultimately just one impact evaluation was
delivered there.
Another challenge faced by 3DE implementers was
identifying questions which met the rigorous criteria of
the programme. These included that the intervention
was feasible to implement in the timescale (9 months),
had potential for wide impact, could be addressed
through a rigorous experimental or quasi-experimental
counterfactual-based impact evaluation, was being rolled
out in a way and timeframe that could be used for the
study, and where the chances of catalysing change in the
future were strong. It is clear that these criteria were,
in combination, very demanding, and this in part ex-
plained the difficulty of identifying successful ques-
tions in Uganda and reaching the targeted four
evaluations in Zambia.
3DE implementers worked closely with Ministry
partners (the MoH in both countries, but also the
Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child
Health (MCDMCH) in Zambia) to source questions, but
partners found it harder to engage in the prioritisation
of questions that involved more technical issues about
research design. This reduced their ultimate ownership
in the process.
Evaluation design, conduct and reporting
The research questions posed by the evaluations were all
shown to address relevant healthcare challenges in
Zambia and Uganda and, in at least one case, the evalu-
ation was timed to meet an important opportunity (a
large-scale bed-net distribution). The others addressed
less urgent issues and took longer to conduct than ori-
ginally prescribed. The rationale for the particular inter-
ventions evaluated in each study, including a description
of underlying challenges and how the intervention
mechanism was expected to address them, was not
always well described in the evaluation reports.
The overall quality of the design of the 3DE evalua-
tions was assessed as variable, with some weaknesses
stemming from the constraints placed on the evaluations
in terms of timeframes and budgets.
One aspect of the evaluation design that was consist-
ently conducted well was the choice of primary outcome
given the available study period. The evaluations all
focused on measures that could be plausibly expected to
change over a period of months if the intervention was
effective. Although all evaluations did make an appropri-
ate choice of primary outcome, there were some issues
with the indicators used to track these outcomes. The
evaluations were also well designed to make efficient use
of the available budget and were organised to minimise
additional workload for health staff by being aligned to a
large degree with current practices in health facilities.
The overriding concern with the design of 3DE evalua-
tions was that the findings were not easily generalisable
to other contexts (i.e. there was a problem with the find-
ings’ low external validity). Many of the evaluations were
only able to cover a limited geographic area and a small
sample due to the relatively low budget and timeframe
to implement the evaluation. There was also a concern
that some of the 3DE evaluations may not have deliv-
ered sufficient internal validity despite their rando-
mised design, given the small size of the treatment
groups. The time and budget constraints also affected
the implementation of the interventions themselves,
which in some cases may have been too ambitious
for the short evaluation period.
In view of some of these concerns it was not clear that
the choice of a given RCT always made the best use of the
available budget. In some cases, a simple operational pilot
or process study might have provided sufficient evidence
around the implementation of interventions to help guide
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future programming decisions. This was particularly the
case for interventions that sought to reinforce existing
practices rather than providing new and previously
untested solutions (such as the Early Infant Diagnosis
simple intervention and the decongestion intervention).
The evaluations appeared to have collected good data
using appropriate techniques. Where the data-collection
processes were reported on, these processes were
assessed as good. Sample sizes were an issue for some of
the evaluations. Quantitative findings were for the most
part presented well. The explanation and interpretation
of results could, however, have been further developed,
with the overall findings better situated within a broader
discussion of the context and likely mechanisms involved.
Dissemination and activities to catalyse implementation
We concluded that 3DE generally had a good awareness
of entry points as well as of key stakeholders and
disseminated evaluation findings well to key stake-
holders, mostly to the implementers of the interventions
they were evaluating. However, in order to provide rapid
feedback, presentations preceded the finalisation of
reports, which was problematic when final findings later
changed. The ensuing ‘policy decisions’ (for the three
completed evaluations) took the form of advisory notes.
The implications of the evaluations were largely man-
agerial, rather than implying larger changes in program-
ming or resource allocation. There was also limited
scope for ‘catalysation’ work (3DE providing supporting
models, costing and plans for scale-up) and uptake had
been limited at the time of evaluation. There was no
resourcing for 3DE to follow-up on what had happened
after ‘policy decisions’ were taken.
3DE did not have a specific capacity-building plan
beyond working closely through the stages of the
programme with MoH/MCDMCH partners. Interviews
indicated that individuals who worked closely with 3DE
did benefit in terms of capacity development. More
broadly, there was an expression of latent demand for
evidence, although not necessarily for evaluations spe-
cifically. Both ministries (MoH and MCDMCH)
lacked a wider strategic approach to evidence and
research, and there was no indication that this had
changed as a result of 3DE.
Key stakeholders did not always have a clear under-
standing of the findings and raised questions about the
external validity of results for other areas of the country
and in ‘normal’ health system conditions. Ownership of
findings was partial. Limited staff time, a lack of capacity
in terms of research staff in key partner agencies, and a
lack of incentives for evidence use were some of the
factors behind this.
Although the timeframe of our evaluation did not per-
mit assessment of outcomes, the expected impact was
unlikely to be transformational. Some 3DE evaluations
supported a reinforced implementation of the status
quo. Others suggested potential for some cost savings,
though only in some contexts in Zambia, and with care-
ful attention to ensure replicability of results. Others
suggested a potential saving but largely for donors.
Explanatory factors
There were a number of issues relating to context and
internal factors that contributed to the failure of the
3DE pilot to achieve its key objectives. Among the con-
textual factors, the lack of an effective strategic priori-
tisation of evidence-based decision-making within
government was highlighted as a constraint, along with
unclear ministry roles in Zambia (linked to the split of
the MoH into two ministries in 2012).
The evidence that was deemed as most in need by
Ministry officials in Zambia was operations research and
situation analyses to identify and rectify bottlenecks in
delivery or service and research to better understand the
behaviour and motivation of end-users in regard to non-
utilisation, as well as synthesis of evidence from other
contexts. National reports also highlight insufficient use
of data at all levels of government and further note that
capacity and funding for research is limited [24].
Demand for impact evaluation evidence is generally low,
although the health sector is seen by some as more
advanced in this respect, with staff having been exposed
to clinical trials during training. Government/donor rela-
tionships are also key to evidence uptake in contexts,
like Zambia, where donor agreement and funding are
crucial to the implementation of policy. This was well
understood by 3DE, but managing these complex
dynamics at various stages of the programme still
required intensive efforts.
Internal programme factors included positive ones,
such as a strong starting base for CHAI, which was well
embedded in the MoH, as well as negative, such as an
initial understaffing of the 3DE Uganda programme.
The degree of involvement of the MoH Principal Inves-
tigators and co-Investigators also varied across the
studies and contexts, as might be expected, according
to individual time and interest; these affected owner-
ship and legacy.
Discussion
This evaluation adds to a small but growing body of
evidence on how to support evaluation evidence uptake
in the sub-Saharan African context. Mijumbi et al. [26],
for example, examine factors affecting evidence uptake
in Uganda, focussing on the degree of control which
policymakers have over the different factors examined,
while Mutatina et al. [27] scope the kinds of evidence
available to health decision-makers in Uganda.
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This evaluation of the 3DE programme faced limita-
tions in terms of the ex-post design and its timing in
relation to the interventions. However, the theory-based
approach, combined with triangulation of different data
sources derived from mixed methods, and a collabora-
tive relationship between the evaluation specialists based
in the programme implementing partner (CHAI), the
commissioning group (UK Department for International
Development) and the evaluation team resulted in rich
results and engagement to absorb the lessons learned.
The evaluation concluded that 3DE had made a very
limited contribution to changing evidence-based policy-
making, capacity and behaviour in both countries. The
main reasons behind this limited impact were judged to
be two-fold. First, 3DE’s goal was inherently over-
ambitious for a 3-year pilot. The overall goal, particularly
in terms of building capacity and changing behaviour,
requires a longer timeframe. Secondly, the programme
had a number of aspirations that were not all compatible
with one another. 3DE aimed to be demand-led, focused
on robust impact evaluations, rapid, responsive and
affordable, as well as catalysing action. A number of
tensions or trade-offs exist within and between these
aspirations. The overall lesson from the pilot is that even
a very professional partnership cannot deliver on all of
these in a short-term project in contexts like Zambia
and Uganda, which are relatively typical of low- and
middle-income settings. The necessary conditions for
success are laid out in the revised theory of change
(Additional file 1), which makes clear the many assump-
tions that need to be met for the desired outcomes to be
reached. A key point arising from the political economy
analysis was that the political economy of each issue
selected for evaluation should influence how ‘progress’ is
defined. For example, where the issue is strongly cen-
trally driven, an evaluation may need to aim to affect
policy decisions taken at a senior level. Where it is not,
it may be more effective to focus on improving oper-
ational decisions and/or improving evaluative thinking
and capacity more generally [25].
There therefore needs to be reflection on which objec-
tives are most important and how to set realistic prior-
ities. Different objectives – such as capacity building,
brokering access to policy-relevant evidence, improving
the supply of evidence, improving service delivery, and
generating demand for evidence – imply different
approaches and targets. The 3DE approach focused
heavily on the characteristics of evaluations which
supported or militated against evidence-based policy but
less on the requirements of the evaluation users, whilst
addressing the wider contextual challenges to evidence
use. The evaluation findings reinforce the wider under-
standing that the demand for evidence varies substan-
tially depending on individual policymaker attitudes,
perceptions about the usefulness of evaluation evidence
and credibility of the evaluator, awareness of evaluation
benefits, technical skill in evaluation methods and the
nature of the political system. Certainly, the presence of
demand cannot be taken for granted and would need to
be assessed on a case by case basis. It may sometimes be
necessary to motivate demand for evaluation evidence
through various strategies, such as the carrots, sticks
and sermons (e.g. regulation, economic incentives and
provision of information) [5].
It is also important to clarify what ‘demand-led’ really
means. In the evaluation team’s view, the 3DE model
was responsive to demand but until there is a much
higher level of evaluative thinking and capacity within
the MoH/MCDMCH, and a more strategic approach to
establishing what evidence is needed in the short,
medium and long terms, what 3DE provides is still ef-
fectively a supply-side activity. The demand for evidence
“encompasses both the capacity to find, evaluate and
use…different forms of evidence and the motivation to
use them to make evidence-informed policy” ([25], p. 17),
ensuring that decision-makers access and use a range of
sources of evidence, not simply those they have directly
commissioned. A priority for such programmes should
be to increase evaluative thinking and capacity within
local institutions to scope, oversee, quality assure and
use evaluations – and more broadly to support what is
now being termed ‘good governance of evidence’ [23].
Building capacity and motivation means strengthening
individual skills, seeding new practices, learning by
doing, sponsoring champions, building networks and
supporting institutional processes [28]. There are some
encouraging examples of government programmes
aiming to do this – in South Africa, for example, the
Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation is
building a demand-driven national evaluation system
which ultimately aims to devolve responsibility for
commissioning evaluations to departments [13, 17].
Whatever the focus chosen, the programme should be
embedded in local institutions, with support provided
externally as needed but with the key staff who are
commissioning, providing, coordinating or brokering
evidence being based within the Ministry or local
research networks and organisations. This would also
allow more flexibility about seizing policy ‘windows’, ra-
ther than having to identify them within the constraints
of a short-term programme. Clearly, not all countries
will have the same evidence needs and so a starting
point for programming should be an understanding of
the local institutional and market context, to understand
what the gaps are and what existing institutions or
networks could be strengthened, alongside the politics of
the sector. In Zambia, for example, limited capacity and
resources to use evidence in the Ministries, a
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neopatrimonial approach to policymaking generally, and
a fragmented research supply market, heavily dependent
on external funding, are some of the factors influencing
how evidence is supplied and used [25].
The emphasis on ‘policy decisions’ or ‘policy changes’,
which is common in externally funded programmes that
want to demonstrate results, can also produce perverse
effects. In the 3DE programme, contributing to a policy
decision was a key performance target. The evaluation
team found this problematic for a few reasons. First, this
is a target that is hard to measure. There are so many
influences on policymaking, many of which cannot be
observed or disentangled, that isolating the contribution
of evidence in shaping a decision is always problematic.
Secondly, while the emphasis on ‘policy decisions’ kept
minds focused on the need to ensure take-up of
research, there is also a potential conflict of interest
between being a supplier of research and helping minis-
tries to analyse and use evidence in a neutral way.
Evidence may be presented to generate momentum for
change, though that change may not be fully justified.
The decision not to scale up a pilot programme (or to
maintain the status quo in some way) also needs to be
classified as a policy decision in this context, if this is
what the evidence recommends.
In addition, if contribution to a policy decision is used
as a target, then ‘policy decision’ should be broadened to
include implementation, given the implementation gap
which is so common in low-income countries [29]. A
focus on more decentralised prioritisation, research and
capacity-building at the district level would also be
appropriate in many settings. Targets should also incorp-
orate a focus on equity to avoid capture by more power-
ful interest groups, including better funded or organised
programmes (such as the expense of less well-resourced
areas, such as non-communicable diseases).
The evaluation also questioned the privileging of RCT-
based impact evaluations as a higher form of knowledge.
Different kinds of evidence are suited for different types
of questions, and the 3DE modality could have focused
on trying to generate or broker evidence that was suit-
able for the Ministry’s priority questions rather than
privileging RCTs. RCTs are less suited to understanding
processes, mechanisms, how and why implementation
occurred, and the influence of context. Ministries rightly
look for a range of information, including on equity and
sustainability of interventions. Demand-generation or
evidence-supply programmes should focus on supporting
and providing appropriate tools for different questions.
Evidence should fit with policy needs, so there should also
be more flexibility about timeframes, for example. In some
cases, having a longer time period would generate more
useful and valuable information for the MoH than infor-
mation generated rapidly. Overall value for money is also
an important consideration. This was not assessed by the
team and is itself a complex question [30]. However, the
overall 3DE programme expenditure (including stages
such as question sourcing and catalysation) was £400,000
per evaluation.
There is a broader question about the primary purpose
of conducting evaluations. The 3DE approach viewed
evaluations as tools for providing answers to policy
questions. In this model, engagement with civil society
and stakeholders is primarily a vehicle for improving the
evidence to inform those answers. Yet, in Zambia, as in
other low-income countries, civil society is generally
weak. A complementary model of the evaluation process
might view evaluations also as tools for engaging civil
society and stakeholders around an issue, helping build
local capacity to define and measure progress by creating
robust and engaged evaluation processes. Thus, a stron-
ger emphasis on the evaluation process, with the aim of
building evaluative thinking and capacity, might help
provide ‘answers’ that have a greater degree of legitimacy
than evaluations that take a more extractive approach to
citizen and stakeholder evidence.
Conclusions
The evaluation of the 3DE programme in Uganda and
Zimbabwe illustrates the complexity of the process of
supporting evidence-based policymaking in healthcare,
as in other sectors, and the need for clarity of focus
and realism of expectations. The 3DE programme
promised an ambitious set of targets, some of which
were in tension with one another. It focused on
producing evaluations whose characteristics would
support evidence-based policymaking, while neglecting
the wider context and the characteristics of evaluation
users. A number of important lessons have been
derived which are likely to apply in other low- and
middle-income settings, such as the importance of
supporting evaluative thinking and capacity within the
wider institutions, of understanding the wider political
economy of evidence use and its uptake, and of
allowing for some flexibility in terms of programme
targets. Fixating on one type of evidence is unhelpful
in the context of institutions like ministries of health,
which require a wide range of evidence to plan and
deliver programmes. In addition, being tied to ‘policy
decisions’ provides perverse incentives and neglects
arguably more important aspects for evaluators, such
as contributing to incremental programmatic
adjustments and improved implementation.
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